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Abstract
We present an empirical analysis of the European electronic interbank market of overnight lend-
ing e-MID during the years 1999–2009. After introducing the market mechanism, we consider
the activity, defined as the number of trades per day; the spreads, defined as the difference
between the rate of a transaction and the key rates of the European Central Bank; the lending
conditions, defined as the difference between the costs of a lent and a borrowed Euro; the bank
strategies, defined through different variants of the cumulative volume functions; etc. Among
other facts, it emerges that the lending conditions differ from bank to bank, and that the bank
strategies are not strongly associated either to the present, past or future spreads. Moreover,
we show the presence of a bid-ask spread-like effect and its behavior during the crisis.
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1. Introduction
Interbank markets play at least two crucial roles in modern financial systems. First and
foremost, it is in such markets that central banks actively intervene to guide their policy interest
rates. Second, well functioning interbank markets effectively channel liquidity from institutions
with a surplus of funds to those in need, allowing for more efficient financial intermediation.
Thus, policymakers have an interest in a financial system with a well functioning and robust
interbank market, that is, one in which the central bank can achieve its desired rate of interest
and one that allows institutions to efficiently trade liquidity. Interbank markets have distinct
features [5]: (i) the information on the majority of trades is not centralised; (ii) the market
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is highly concentrated [20]; (iii) given the close players, reputation plays an important role;
(iv) the market is deeply influenced by the monetary policy; (v) banks tend to prefer to deal
with other banks instead of resorting to central bank facilities; (vi) some market participants
systematically provide liquidity and others systematically demand for liquidity; (vii) large banks
typically borrow from a number of smaller creditors [21].
The interbank market can be managed in different ways: physically on the floor, by telephone
calls, or continuously on electronic platforms. In Europe, the interbank trades are quoted in all
these ways, generating high information asymmetries. The only electronic brokerage market is
the Italy-based market e-MID (electronic Market for Interbank Deposits) aimed at allowing an
electronic and multilateral management of banks’ treasury flows. Moreover, all the trades, being
of relevant size, are automatically settled in real time via TARGET 2. E-MID is a centralised
market for the interbank lending of capitals in four different currencies (Euro, British Pound,
US Dollars and Polish Zloty), directly or via agent banks, and for a rich set of different contract
specifications, such as different maturities. However, the large majority of volumes are traded in
the Euro section of the market, and, more specifically, on the overnight contracts, defined as the
trade for a transfer of funds to be effected on the day of the trade and to return on the subsequent
business day. The number of transactions and the volume increased systematically until the
beginning of the financial crisis, with an average of 450 transactions each day and an average
exposure of about 5.5 million Euros per transaction. This evolution has been explained with the
trend toward real-time settlement for payments, securities, and foreign exchange transactions
that took place in recent years [4]. This trend has increased the value of intraday liquidity.
Interbank deposits as a percentage of total assets of the banking system increased from 8% in
1993 to approximately 16% in 2007 [20].
The e-MID is an order-driven market, providing full information on the order book and
allowing the participants to directly act on it, without any intermediary institution between
potentially matching interests. Each participant lending capitals must actively accept or decline
a trade with another bank; the market does not provide any built-in mechanism to consistently
check the counterparty risk; credit lines at each institution must apply their own criteria and
limits in selecting their trading partners. While for example in futures markets participants
are asked to deposit a margin in order to partially cover their counterparty risk, until the
2007 financial crisis, and above all until the Lehman Brothers collapse, interbank markets were
completely non collateralised, both because of the insignificant probability of default of the
banking system and for the very short maturity of exposures. Since the beginning of the crisis,
interbank trades have been characterised by reduced volumes and the exit of a relevant number of
institutions. Central banks have changed their role from lenders of last resort to primary liquidity
providers of the system. Moreover, to enhance the recovery of interbank markets, central banks
incentivised the creation of collateralised interbank markets, to increase the expected recovery
rate and to ensure complete anonymity of trades. It is the responsibility of central banks to
evaluate the collaterals provided by banks, to verify that trades comply with established limits
and conditions, and to ensure the prompt settlement of transactions in the event of a participant’s
default, subsequently recovering the amount from the deposited collateral.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the financial crisis dramatically changed the
correlation between size and interest rates of interbank trades, determining large spreads among
financial agents that depend on their default probability and reputation. This outcome proves
the need for a collateralised and anonymous segment of the market, with a direct role of central
banks as guarantors. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the mechanism of
the electronic interbank market and Section 3 describes the database. Section 4 describes how
interest rates and spreads change during time, particularly within an intraday horizon. Section
5 addresses the analysis to volumes, and Section 6 focuses the analysis to correlations between
strategies, sizes and interest rate levels. Section 7 presents our findings on the cost of money for
banks before and after the beginning of the financial crisis. Section 8 contains the conclusions.
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2. Market Mechanism
The e-MID trades continuously, without opening or closing auctions, and with only a session
of post-trading activity aimed at controlling and clearing the trades. There are two independent
and, in principle, separate sections called transparent and anonymous. In the former each
operator knows the institution behind each pending quote; in the latter the institutions are left
anonymous.
The order book is filled by both requests of lending and borrowing capitals; however, as
each market participant applies its own credit criteria and limits, the aggregation of the pending
liquidity does not necessarily provide homogeneous tradable prices and quantities to each player.
For example, an aggressor, defined as an operator who takes away liquidity from the book, is
not necessarily able to trade the best pending prices as he may see a potential match denied
by the candidate counterparty. Or, likewise, if the most competitive prices are posted by a
counterparty feebly creditworthy for his criteria and limits, he could deliberately prefer to match
a less competitive quote. Therefore e-MID does not systematically match the orders and the
pending liquidity may overlap. In Figure 1 we depict a possible state of the book, using the
same scheme normally dedicated to a security market. The different textures stand for different
institutions, the height for the proposed volumes and the position on the x-axis for the proposed
rate. The black solid blocks are those posted into the anonymous section of the market. Figure 1
(right) shows the possible overlap of orders. In a usual stock-like market, where an overlapping
limit order is immediately executed as a built-in mechanism and where the players do not have
to manage the counterparty risk, this would not be possible.
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Figure 1: Scheme of a virtual aggregation of the order book. Different textures stand for different institutions,
the height for the proposed volumes and the position on the x-axis for the proposed rate. The black solid blocks
are those posted into the anonymous section of the market. On the right we show the possible virtual overlapping
of orders.
Specifically, the market operations are:
1. Quote. As in a security market, participants send their quotes as proposals. At any given
time, the set of all pending quotes forms the pending liquidity.
2. Aggression. The usual market orders are replaced by aggression: an operator willing to
remove liquidity from the book, i.e. to trade immediately without the uncertainty of limit
orders, can deliberately pick a quote and manifest his will to match with the opposite
interest.
3. Acceptance. The quoter of an ask quote, i.e. a quoter willing to lend capital, has the option
to reject an aggression. This major difference from a security market gives a participant
the opportunity to choose his counterparty and manage the credit risk.
4. Proposal. An aggressor can subordinate his will to close a trade to specific requests, such
as a larger or smaller volume or a different rate.
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The operator posting a quote anonymously (direct order) is disclosed only by another operator
aggressing the pending quote. Both operators have the option of not closing a trade after
knowing the candidate counterparty.
3. Data Set
In order to clarify which information is in our hands, we describe more precisely the contents
of our database. The database is composed by the records of all transactions registered in the
period 01/1999–12/2009 in the Mercato Interbancario elettronico dei Depositi (e-MID). The
period has been chosen in order to investigate banks’ behavior before, during and after the
subprime crisis in the Euro area. Each line contains a code labeling the quoting bank, i.e.
the bank that proposes a transaction, and the aggressor bank, i.e. the bank that accepts a
proposed transaction. These parts are public regardless of the market section used to negotiate
the transaction (transparent or anonymous); i.e. the parts are disclosed after a trade has taken
place, even if the negotiations started from an anonymous order. The rate received by the
lending bank is expressed per year; the volume of the transaction, i.e. the amount of lent money,
is expressed in millions of Euros. A label indicates the side of the aggressor bank, i.e. whether the
latter is lending/selling (“Sell”) or borrowing/buying (“Buy”) capitals to or from the quoting
bank. Other labels indicate the dates and the exact time of the transaction. Moreover, the
records contain the contract the two banks are trading. The main difference between contracts
is the length of the lending period. We consider only the overnight (“ON”) and the overnight
long (“ONL”) contracts. The latter is the version of the ON when more than one night elapses
between two consecutive business days due to weekends or bank holidays. The banks are reported
with a label for their country, an individual code and, when they are Italian, a label for their
class of capitalization (major, large, medium, small, minor). A couple of example records are
reported in Table 1.
Market Duration Date Time Rate Amount Start Date
“EUR” “ONL” “2007-01-02” “8:52:41” 3.60 160.00000 “2007-01-02”
“EUR” “ON” “2007-01-02” “8:52:54” 3.60 50.00000 “2007-01-02”
End Date Quoter Group Quoter Aggressor Group Aggressor Verb
“2007-01-03” “IT0276” “ME” “IT0271” “GR” “Sell”
“2007-01-03” “IT0162” “PI” “GR0006” “ND” “Sell”
Table 1: Two example records from the data set. Quoter and aggressor are the banks participating to the trade.
The groups are the classification of Italian banks with respect to their size. The label “Buy” indicates that the
quoting bank is on the buy side, the label “Sell” that it is on the sell side.
We do not have any information regarding when and how a particular section of the market
is used, i.e. whether some banks prefer to remain anonymous during the negotiation; we do not
know whether a transaction is the result of a specific proposals (see Sec. 1) and, finally, we do
not know the content of the order book, i.e. we do not have complete information on the state of
the liquidity, its dynamics and how the banks use this information when acting on the market.
Various past studies investigated similar data [15] or the same data [26, 23, 22, 21, 11, 29],
although not always for the same length of time. In one case the whole book information was
studied [7].
4. Rates and Spreads
The symbols vi and ri indicate, respectively, the exchanged volume and the rate of transaction
i. As a first step we classically compute the mean rate registered in each analyzed trading day
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d as
r¯d =
1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
ri, (1)
where Nd is the number of transactions in day d. The results are reported in Figure 2. As a
test we have computed also the volume-weighted daily mean rate
r¯vd =
∑Nd
i=1 viri∑Nd
i=1 vi
. (2)
The results of this second estimation are extremely close to the previous and thus we do not
display a separate figure. Together with the daily mean rate, Figure 2 reports the ECB key
rates for the considered period.
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Figure 2: The mean daily rate (black) plotted together with the ECB key rates (coloured). The first vertical line
marks the subprime crisis of August 2007 and the second the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
The ECB defines the rates as follows [13]:
1. Marginal lending facility rate (EuroMLR): the rate fixed by the ECB for operations where
counterparties can use the marginal lending facility to obtain overnight liquidity from the
national central banks (NCBs) against eligible assets. The interest rate on the marginal
lending facility normally provides a ceiling for the overnight market interest rate.
2. Main refinancing facility operations (EuroRPS): regular liquidity-providing reverse trans-
actions with a frequency and maturity of one week. They are executed by the NCBs
on the basis of standard tenders and according to a pre-specified calendar. The main
refinancing operations play a pivotal role in fulfilling the aims of the Eurosystem’s open
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market operations and normally provide the bulk of refinancing to the financial sector.
The corresponding rate is here called EuroRPS.
3. Deposit facility rate (EuroDEP): counterparties can use the deposit facility to make overnight
deposits with the NCBs. The interest rate on the deposit facility normally provides a floor
for the overnight market interest rate.
The mean daily spreads in day d with respect to the EuroMLR, EuroRPS and EuroDEP are
s¯Ed =
1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
(ri − rEd ) (3)
where the superscript E is a label for EuroMLR, EuroRPS or EuroDEP. Figure 3 shows the
results of this computation (left) together with the relative mean daily spread (right) defined as
w¯Ed =
s¯Ed
rEd
. (4)
Even though the ECB changed twice the definition of the EuroMLR, this decision does not affect
the significance of our analysis.
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Figure 3: Left: mean daily spreads, Eq. (3). Right: relative mean daily spreads, Eq. (4). It is clearly possible to
distinguish two different behaviors, one for the long period before the Lehman collapse, and one for the subsequent
period.
Observing the spreads, it is clearly possible to distinguish two different regimes. In the period
preceding the Lehman Brothers collapse the spreads oscillate around a somehow stable value,
while in the subsequent period the spreads oscillate more heavily at levels lower than usual.
More specifically, after September 2008 the EuroRPS spread assumed consistently negative
values, with the mean daily rate much below the usual ceiling roughly defined by the EuroMLR
rate. In fact, the way the official rate corridor is designed — all the rates are compared with the
official refinancing rate — makes it physiological that the EuroDEP spread is positive around
1%, the EuroMLR spread is negative around -1%, and the EuroRPS spread oscillates around
0%. The rationale of these spread values is that all the interbank rates should always remain
higher (or equal) than the best borrowing rate of the central bank (EuroDEP) to incentive a
demand for ECB funds. This way, the official rates directly shape all the credit rates, affecting
both the price and the volume of credit.
Figure 3 (left) shows that before the financial crisis the expected values were confirmed, and
also before the Lehman bankruptcy. What really shocked the rate structure was the collapse
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of the US investment bank, when all the spreads declined by about 1%. Until the end of 2009,
as shown in Figure 3, borrowing money from the interbank market costed significantly less
than refinancing from the central bank. This phenomenon lasted in 2010 too. This evidence
reveals that the European Central Bank did not cut its official rates as much as other monetary
authorities, the Federal Reserve above all, but tolerated that interbank rates fell below the main
refinancing rate: the huge amount of liquidity injected by the ECB during the crisis affected so
much the interest rate level.
The period between the subprime shock and the Lehman collapse, when official interest rates
did not significantly change, shows a good relative spread control, see Eq. (4) and Figure 3 (right),
while the subsequent cut of official rates generated an exceptional increase of the opportunity
cost of lending money with interbank deposits instead of putting money in deposit facilities.
4.1. Intraday price of money
Similarly to a previous study [4], we consider the annual average EuroRPS spread as a
function of the intraday time. More precisely, for each day d we compute the instantaneous
mean value s¯Ed (t) considering the trades performed in the 30 minutes before and after t. We
then average these quantities over all trading days within each year. The results are reported
in Figure 4. Our outcomes reflect the immediate liquidation of the trades: since all overnight
deposits must be regulated the subsequent business day at 9am, their time length decreases
during the trading day. A negative shape of the spread was already observed by Baglioni
and Monticini (2008) for the period 2003–2004. While Baglioni and Monticini used interest
rate differences with respect to the daily average, we compute the spread with respect to the
refinancing rate (EuroRPS) in order to isolate intraday patterns of the banks’ convenience to
borrow money on the interbank market. For all the considered years (1999–2009) the pattern is
negative. This validates the hypothesis that the interbank market implicitly transforms overnight
loans into intraday loans, as proved by Baglioni and Monticini (2008). Since the ECB requires
that all lending must be collateralized, banks could prefer to pay higher rates in the interbank
market. Nevertheless, when we compare the maximum spread from 2000 to 2009, we observe
a sharp change after the crisis (Figure 5). The spread exceeds the maximum value of 0.02 and
in 2009 raises to 0.045. This phenomenon is explained by the extraordinary liquidity need of
European banks during the crisis. Furthermore, we observe a more regular shape during the
crisis years (from 2007 to 2009).
This arises a question: why should banks pay high interest rates early in the morning instead
of waiting for an overnight loan traded in the afternoon? To answer we must recall the real time
gross settlement introduced with the Euro and the need to pay back overnight deposits opened
the day before. This means that from 8:30 to 9:00 am banks need to find money to regulate
their debt. Usually, this is generated by physiological cash ins, while our results show that banks
must find liquidity within the interbank market. Such a situation could be defined as hyper-
speculative in a Minsky bank strategy [28], or, in other terms, a “borrow from Peter to pay
Paul” strategy, as an early warning of trouble that ultimately results in undertaking a radical
debt resolution scheme, bankruptcy, or even foreclosure.
4.2. Interest rate volatility
The intraday rate pattern shows an increasing volatility during the crisis. The daily rate
volatility σd for day d is computed classically as
σd =
√√√√ 1
Nd − 1
Nd∑
i=1
(ri − r¯d)2. (5)
Its monthly average is reported in Figure 6 (left) together with its normalized value σd/r¯d (right).
Figure 6 shows the magnitude of the interbank rate volatility after the two most critical events,
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Figure 4: Mean EuroRPS spread s¯(t) as a function of the time of the day averaged over all trading days in each
year with a time window of t± 30 minutes.
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Figure 5: Mean spread range (max-min of Figure 4) from 2000 to 2009.
respectively the subprime shock and the Lehman Brothers collapse. Two well-defined peaks are
visible in the months after the two crisis milestones. Most of all, we can observe in Figure 6 (left)
how the monthly volatility coefficient restored to pre-crisis levels within few weeks, thanks to
a huge amount of liquidity provided by the European Central Bank. A different result appears
when we estimate the normalised daily volatility averaged over a month, see Figure 6 (right).
Here, the volatility continuously rises from 2% to 24%.
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Figure 6: Left: Daily rate volatility averaged over a month. Right: Normalized daily rate volatility averaged
over a month. The daily rate volatility (left) shows two well defined peaks in the months following the two crisis
milestones.
To explain the monotonic pattern of volatility and the apparently ineffective reduction of
volatility between the two critical events (subprime crisis and Lehman collapse), we estimated
the equation explaining the one-month rate volatility with an OLS estimate of the model
σMDi = α+ β0σ
OS
i + γ0V
dep
i + ζ0V
lend
i + η−1σ
MD
i−1 + β−1σ
OS
i−1 + γ−1V
dep
i−1 + ζ−1V
lend
i−1 (6)
with autoregressive variables lagged by one month and an error correction model, where
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• σMDi is the standard deviation of one month deposit log returns;
• σOSi is the standard deviation of overnight swap log returns;
• V depi is the amount of bank liquidity deposited at the ECB (million Euros);
• V lendi is the amount of bank liquidity borrowed from the ECB (million Euros).
The hypothesis behind the relation between volatility and volumes is that the rate volatility
should be negatively correlated with the amount of deposit facilities. Results are shown in
Table 2.
Pre subprime crisis Post subprime crisis Post Lehman collapse
02/01/2005–08/08/2007 09/08/2007–12/09/2008 12/09/2009–26/07/2010
α 1.24E-6 -7.88E-5 -3.67E-5
β0 0.301514** 0.104724 0.018339*
γ0 3.73E-9** 7.12E-9*** 7.06E-7***
ζ0 -7.13E-9** 8.12E-7*** -2.32E-9***
η−1 0.074614** 0.035887*** 0.293388***
β−1 0.460955*** 0.072291*** 0.169428***
γ−1 5.75E-9 1.20E-8*** 1.25E-7***
ζ−1 -4.61E-9 2.56E-7* -1.73E-9*
Error correction model -0.032949*** -0.037971*** -0.046397***
Adjusted R2 0.712308 0.519221 0.545169
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.241081 1.998579 1.867629
P (F -statistics) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
* means significantly different from zero at 10% level (two-tail t-test), ** at 5% level, and
*** at 1% level.
Table 2: One-month interest rate volatility model by the ECB lending and deposit facilities, Eq. (6). Coefficients
with subscript -1 refer to independent variables lagged by one month.
Our findings show that the expected correlations are confirmed before the subprime crisis
and after the Lehman collapse, while in between deposit facilities and rate volatilities change,
indicating the failure of policy makers to manage the interbank interest rate volatility. This
power was restored after the Lehman bankruptcy, when not only central banks but also the US
and European governments intervened to support the banks’ credibilities, collateralizing bond
issues and interbank deposits to enhance the banking system’s trustworthiness.
4.3. Bid-ask spread
It has been well documented within the market microstructure literature that liquidity fac-
tors are important determinants of stock and bond returns. Such returns have been found to be
affected by liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread [2, 3, 24, 12], the price impact of trades
[6], and the volume or turnover ratio [17, 10]. Cherubini [9] modeled the liquidity risk by the
proxy of the bid-ask spread in the market. Other papers based on the bid-ask spread have been
proposed [1, 8, 19, 16, 14]. This approach is coherent with the examination procedures listed
by the Federal Reserve even before the financial crisis (1998), asking to obtain all management
information, reviewing bid/ask assumptions in a normal market scenario and reviewing stress
tests that analyze the widening of bid/ask spreads and determining the reasonableness of as-
sumptions. The estimation of the bid-ask spread helps to assess the liquidity pressure during
the crisis. Therefore, for each day we separate the transactions labeled “Sell” from those labeled
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“Buy” and consider the corresponding rates (“Sell” indicates that the quoter bank is borrowing
and the aggressor is lending, “Buy” the opposite). The mean values are then defined as
r¯sd =
∑Nsd
i=1 v
s
i r
s
i∑Nsd
i=1 v
s
i
(7)
r¯bd =
∑Nbd
i=1 v
b
i r
b
i∑Nbd
i=1 v
b
i
(8)
where N sd and N
b
d are the numbers of sell and buy transactions in day d. The bid-ask (or
sell-buy) spread is now computed as
ssbd = r¯
s
d − r¯bd. (9)
Figure 7 shows the monthly average of ssbd . The presence of this spread is the first non-trivial
conclusion we can draw from the plot. The market is in fact different from more usual order-book
markets. Moreover, two well defined peaks are clearly present after the crisis milestones. Their
presence is a clear proxy of the diffidence that the banks had during the worst moments of the
crisis. During the crisis some bid-ask spreads experienced values higher than 200 basis points,
while the usual pre-crisis level was around 3 basis points. Paradoxically, the liquidity stress
seems to have been absorbed just before the Lehman collapse, when the bid-ask spread dropped
below 5 basis points, i.e. the resistance level empirically observed before the sub-prime shock.
This allows us to remark that this illiquidity proxy does not provide any early warning signal.
Moreover, in both landmark events the spread trend appears to have been absorbed within a
few weeks, exhibiting a strong correlation with the rate volatility pattern in Figure 6 (left). This
is certainly due to the massive liquidity intervention of the European Central Bank, that from
June 2007 to June 2010 increased its assets by about 600 billion Euros (+65%) using standing
facilities, marginal lending facilities and open market operations, and easing the procedures and
the eligible assets required to borrow money.
5. Volumes, Trades and Active Banks
In the following the term monthly refers to a calendar month, i.e. from the 1st to the 30th,
31th or 28th (29th) day of a given month. This is an important remark because often, for
accounting reasons, this is not the case. As before, the vertical lines in the figures indicate the
beginning of the subprime crisis (August 2007) and the collapse of Lehman Bothers (September
2008). Moreover, the results are presented separating trades into deals where liquidity went from
the aggressor bank to the quoter (“Sell” label) or the opposite (“Buy” label). Monthly averages
of daily exchanged volumes, number of trades, active banks and quoting/aggressing banks are
given in Figures 8, 9 and 10. The main difference between the pre- and post-crisis periods is the
magnitude of the traded volumes. They have been steadily increasing until August 2007 and then
rapidly collapsed after this point in time. It is unlikely that the overnight interbank market lost
all this volume of trades. There are two factors: on the supply side, banks cut their exposures
in order to reduce the loss-given default in a period of banking crises; on the demand side,
banks preferred to avoid disclosing their need for liquidity in order to protect their reputation.
Therefore, the interbank market volumes dropped and the grey market compensated.
6. Correlations Between Banks’ Strategies and Rate Levels
In this section we would like to understand whether the banks act on the market regardless
of the traded rate level or whether they take it into consideration. We restrict the analysis only
to the transactions registered in the period 1999–2002 (1020 days). This restriction stems from
our wish to discuss qualitatively the effect (or its absence) and from the nature of the statistics:
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Figure 7: Monthly average of the daily sell-buy spread defined in Eq. (9). Two well defined peaks are clearly
present after the crisis milestones.
for a reliable estimation we have to restrict the number of analyzed banks and use the period
with the highest activity (by number of trades).
In the 1999–2009 period 269 different banks participated to the market operations, but most
of them made very few transactions or participated only for a small number of days. We selected
a subset of banks according to the same criteria of a previous analysis based on the same data
set [23]. Only the 86 banks that participated actively to the market for more than 900 days and
with more than 1000 transactions are considered. According to the same criteria, [23] considered
85 banks.
The cumulative volume function represents the net presence in the market, i.e. the strategy
of a given bank. Two variants of this function are presented and analyzed here:
1. The simple cumulative volumes:
vsimpi (t) =
Ni(t)∑
j=1
vij , (10)
where Ni(t) is the number of transactions performed by bank i up to time t and vij is
the (signed) volume lent or borrowed by bank i in its transaction j. Notice that the
index j runs over the transactions of each single bank and not over the total number of
transactions. To give the reader a qualitative idea of their behavior, Figure 11 reports a
few random examples of the simple cumulative functions.
2. The absolute cumulative volumes:
vabsi (t) =
Ni(t)∑
j=1
|vij |, (11)
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Figure 8: Left: monthly averages of daily volumes. Right: monthly averages of daily trades. In both cases
trades have been separated into deals where the money went from the aggressor bank to the quoter (“Sell” label,
continuous lines) or the opposite (“Buy” label, dashed lines).
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Figure 9: Monthly average of daily active banks. A bank is considered active if it takes part in at least one trade
during a given day, irrespective of its side (as quoter or aggressor).
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Figure 10: Left: monthly averages of the daily active banks acting as quoters. Right: monthly averages of daily
active banks acting as aggressors. In both cases the trades have been divided respecting the “Sell” and “Buy”
label in the records, indicating that the money flows from the aggressor to the quoter in the first case, and in the
opposite direction in the second case.
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with Ni(t) and vij defined as above.
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Figure 11: Examples of the simple cumulative volume functions for five banks.
We are interested in the correlation between the banks’ strategies, measured through these
functions, and the interest rates. When speaking about spread in the following we refer to the
spread between the transaction rates and the EuroRPS rate.
6.1. Hayashi-Yoshida estimator
The Hayashi-Yoshida (HY) correlation estimator [18] for asynchronous data as those of high-
frequency financial time series is defined as
ρ(vi(t), s(t))λmax =
∑H
h=1(vih − v¯i)(sh − s¯)√∑H
h=1(vih − v¯i)2
√∑H
h=1(sh − s¯)2
, (12)
where H is the number of intervals of length λmax, vih is the increment of one of the cumulative
volume functions defined above for bank i in time interval h, sh is the mean value of the spread
in time interval h, and v¯i =
1
H
∑H
h=1 vih and s¯ =
1
H
∑H
h=1 sh are the sampled mean values of
these quantities.
The HY method is a generalization of the classical Pearson estimator, consisting in how the
elements vih and sh are computed. If no events are registered in a specific bin h > 1, the values
of vih and sh are set equal to vi(h−1) and sh−1 respectively; if h = 1, their values are set equal to
zero. The symbol λmax for the bin width has been chosen to emphasize the connection between
this estimator and the Fourier method explained in the following subsection.
6.2. Fourier estimator
A method introduced by Malliavin and Mancino [25] uses the Fourier expansion of a time
series. It is explained extensively in almost any paper that uses it, see for example Reno´ [27],
but it is worth to write it once more here in a different more compact way that brings us directly
to a simple formula to compute the Fourier coefficients.
Rescaling the time by a factor 2pi/T to the interval [0, 2pi], where T is the length of the time
series, for our purpose we can define
ck(vi) =
∫ 2pi
0
exp(ikt)dvi(t) (13)
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where vi(t) is one of the cumulative volume functions defined above. From the definition of vi(t)
it is possible to write
ck(vi) =
∫ 2pi
0
exp(ikt)d
Ni(t)∑
j=0
vij
 , (14)
where the explicit case of the simple cumulative volume function has been taken as example.
Continuing with the manipulation in order to obtain a simple tool for the estimation, we note
that d
(∑Ni(t)
j=0 vij
)
=
∑Ni(t)
j=0 vijδ(t − tij), where tij is the time of the transaction j of bank i,
and finally we obtain
ck(vi) =
Ni(t)∑
j=0
exp(iktij)vij . (15)
Usually these coefficients are reported as the coefficients of the cosine and sine transforms, ak(vi)
and bk(vi), respectively, i.e. the real and imaginary parts of ck(vi),
ak(vi) = Re ck(vi), bk(vi) = Im ck(vi). (16)
The real parts of the Fourier coefficients of the covariance matrix elements Σ2is of the cumulative
volume function vi(t) and the spread s(t) can be obtained as
ak(Σ
2
is) = lim
kmax→∞
pi
2kmax
kmax∑
j=1
[aj(vi)aj+k(s) + aj(s)aj+k(vi)] . (17)
The elements σ2is of the integrated covariance matrix of the two time series can then be obtained
as
σ2is = 2pia0(Σ
2
is). (18)
Finally, the correlation is
ρ(vi(t), s(t))λmax ≡ ρis =
σ2is
σiiσss
. (19)
In each application, kmax is finite and defines the time scale λmax = T/(2kmax) at which the
correlation is observed. Notice the correspondence between this value and the bin width in the
definition of the HY estimator.
6.3. Results
One of our main aims is to analyze the correlation ρ(vi(t), s(t+k∆t)) between the cumulative
volume functions previously defined and the past, present or future spreads, for an integer k and
some time interval ∆t. We fixed ∆t and λmax to half a day, i.e. 1/(2×1020) of the whole analyzed
interval, for both estimation methods, which are compared in Figure 12 using the simple volumes
and k = 0. A different choice of these parameters does not change the qualitative behavior of
the results, which are shown in Figures 13 and 14, where only the Fourier method is used.
Figure 15 shows the variance of the distributions of the considered correlations versus the
lag. For both vsimpi (t) and v
abs
i (t) the variance has a maximum at zero lag and decreases for both
positive and negative lags, i.e. for both future and past spreads, without showing substantial
difference in the two directions.
7. Banks’ Cost of Money
It is interesting to study whether some banks are able to borrow money for a lower rate than
others and which market microstructure factors may explain this phenomenon. To do so, we
consider the two weighted sums
c±i =
∑
j v
±
ij(wj − w¯j)∑
j v
±
ij
, (20)
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Figure 12: Correlation of the simple cumulative volumes vsimpi (t) with the spread s(t) using the Hayashi-Yoshida
(red line) and Fourier (blue line) methods. The banks are ordered by the value of the correlation given by the
Fourier method. Apart from the different noisiness, which is lower in the Fourier case, the two methods are
consistent, giving similar results and thus validating each other.
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Figure 13: Correlation of the simple cumulative volumes vsimpi (t) with the lagged spreads s(t + k∆t) using the
Fourier method. The banks are ordered by the value of the correlation at zero lag.
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where v±ij are the lent (+) or borrowed (-) simple volumes, see Eq. (10), and wj is the relative
spread of transaction j, see Eq. (4). The mean relative spread w¯j uses a 30 minutes window.
As before, i labels the different banks. Here the interesting quantity is the difference di between
these two weighted sums,
di = c
+
i − c−i . (21)
The results are summarized in Figure 16, which shows that some banks are able to obtain
substantially better rates, while others obtain substantially worse rates. This may be due to:
• Risk rank of the firm: each bank is implicitly ranked by its probability of default; other
firms ask a higher price (rate) when lending money to a risky firm, and a lower price when
lending to a safer firm.
• Trading team skill: some banks could have invested more resources in their trading teams
in this market, and this may improve their capability to obtain better rates.
• Taking prevalently one side of the trade: we observed in Sec. 4.3 that acting as quoter
instead of aggressor brings the advantage of gaining on the bid-ask spread, in the same
fashion as in a stock market. If a firm is more capable to fulfill its needs as quoter it
automatically gains better rates.
• Business opportunities during the day: some banks could have better business opportu-
nities than others during the day, so they accept to pay a higher rate in order to quickly
access funds to invest in these opportunities.
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Figure 16: Weighted differences di between the lent and borrowed volumes, see Eqs. (20) and (21) in Sec. 7.
Calling ai and qi the number of times the bank i concluded a trade respectively as aggressor
or quoter and defining the difference
ui = ai − qi, (22)
19
we can compute the magnitude of its linear dependence on di. If this measure is sensibly different
in the three periods we can infer that trading prevalently as a quoter gave more advantages during
the crisis periods, explaining at least partially the different shapes of Figure 16. Table 3 reports
three measures of linear dependence and no clear pattern is recognisable. We understand that
acting as a quoter is indeed connected with advantages, but their magnitude did not change
between the pre-crisis and the crisis periods.
Pre crisis Post crisis Post Lehman collapse
Pearson -0.2166 -0.4302 -0.3622
Kendall -0.3578 -0.3396 -0.3363
Spearman -0.5015 -0.4778 -0.4895
Table 3: Measures of linear dependence of ui as defined in Eq. (22) on di as defined in Eq. (21). No difference
among the periods can be isolated clearly, suggesting that acting prevalently as a quoter yielded similar results
before and during the crisis.
However, we can add another piece of information exploiting the label attached to each bank
code, as shown in Sec. 3. The label can take six different values, five to indicate the bank size
by total assets according to the classification scheme of the Bank of Italy (“MA” for “maggiori”
i.e. major, “GR” for “grandi” i.e. large, “ME” for “medie” i.e. medium, “PI” for “piccole” i.e.
small, “MI” for “minori” i.e. minor) and “FB” for “foreign bank” when the bank is not Italian.
Table 4 gives the mean banks’ cost of money for these six classes in the three periods. The
main effects we can observe are a loss of performance of major/large banks and an increase of
performance of non Italian banks.
Pre crisis Post crisis Post Lehman collapse
Major -0.0039 -0.0310 -0.0404
Large -0.0023 -0.0398 0.0124
Medium 0.0001 0.0099 0.0047
Small 0.0161 0.0305 0.0232
Minor 0.0070 0.0074 0.0092
Non Italian 0.0051 0.0166 0.0347
Table 4: Mean cost of money for each bank group during the three analyzed periods: the turmoil affected mostly
the performance of major/large banks (negatively) and of non-Italian banks (positively).
8. Discussion and Conclusion
The e-MID electronic overnight interbank market is a example of order-driven market; its
features are built with the purpose of making the operators able to choose their counterparties
and protect their identity. We have shown a collapse of the traded volumes during the crisis,
which is a probable indication of a more risk-adverse behavior: the firms prefer to negotiate
their overnight positions on a one-to-one basis rather than in a disclosed market. We computed
the intraday structure of the negotiated rates reflecting the effective length of the contracts. The
spreads between the mean rates and the ECB key rates behave in a very different manner after
the Lehman Brothers collapse. In the same fashion as in a stock market we can see an increase
of the rate volatility. Moreover, we have used a bid-ask spread as a good proxy of the market
liquidity. The absence of a significant correlation between the rates and the banks’ strategies
suggests that the institutions use the interbank market considering mainly external factors, i.e.
their trading activities is not highly conditioned by the rate level. Finally, we have shown that
some banks are able to obtain substantially better prices when acting on the market and that
20
the magnitude of this diversity strongly increases during the crisis. This advantage may be
the result of more advanced trading techniques or, more interestingly, may reflect the different
unofficial trust levels of the institutions.
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